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Hollander: Scholarly Investigation

THE “STEP-CHILD OF SCHOLARLY INVESTIGATION”1:
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF
ACADEMIC JEWISH LAW SCHOLARSHIP
David Hollander*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Why a book-length bibliography? It is a question I was
repeatedly asked by friends and family, and even colleagues, unable to
understand why I would spend three years reading every law journal
article I could find that had anything to do with Jewish law, and why I
would write an annotation for each article, adding up to 245 pages of
annotations. What could such a project contribute to scholarship, and
how would it be helpful? After all, a few quick database searches can
yield hundreds of law journal articles about Jewish law. Why do we
need a book, a print book no less, that lists and describes them? 2 But
what I set out to write was different from a mere bibliography of the
type typically appearing at the end of a scholarly paper, article or book.
In form, a list of works with annotations for each, would certainly be
like those works cited lists. However careful attention to the curation
of the material is what I hoped would set the type of bibliography I
wrote apart. In addition, I intended to use my judgment as a librarian
to choose which works to add to the bibliography, how to describe
them, which features to identify each annotation, and how to place each
work cited in the most illuminating context of the larger bibliography.
In the preface to my book, I argued that this sort of oldfashioned bibliography provides value to researchers, even in our era
of electronic database searching. It merits mentioning that such an old* Librarian for Law & Legal Scholarship, librarian for Judaic Studies and Hebrew, at
Princeton University Library.
1 Max May, Jewish Criminal Law and Legal Procedure, 31 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 438,
447 (1940) (arguing that Jewish law, long a “step-child of scholarly investigation,” exerted an
important influence on Western law, from medieval Europe through Colonial America).
2 DAVID HOLLANDER, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN JEWISH LAW (2017).
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fashioned bibliography is certainly not intended to replace database
searching. After all, I used databases to identify the articles that I
wanted to include in the book. However, there is great value in an
annotated bibliography crafted by a human who reads and understands
the nuances and subtleties of the source material, and who therefore
can identify connections between sources, trends in the scholarship,
and gaps in the literature. Identifying and explaining these features
across a broad swath of scholarship, from a bibliographic perspective,
provides researchers with pathways to then dig into scholarly literature
for further study, and this cannot be replicated by a database.
What is a bibliographic perspective, and how is it different
from the more standard substantive scholarly perspective? A
bibliographic perspective provides, in part, a wider perspective than
the standard scholarly perspective, which I will call substantive
scholarship. But it is more than merely a “broader-then-typical”
perspective. In a way, a bibliographic perspective is the sort of reverse
of the substantive scholarly perspective. Typically, a faculty
researcher or scholar should be familiar with the general subject of his
or her scholarship, say constitutional law, and an expert in the specific
area he or she is researching, say establishment clause jurisprudence.
A bibliographer’s focus, in contrast, is in reverse. The bibliographer
should be an expert in the bibliographic make-up of the broad area of
scholarship, and merely familiar with some of the details of more
specific areas. The bibliographer should have the time and perspective
to recognize broader trends and citation patterns across a body of
scholarly literature by asking questions like: who is writing what, in
which journal, how often, over what period of time, who is citing
whom, who is criticizing whom, how do parts of the scholarship
overlap, and how does the scholarly material develop over time? By
focusing on these types of questions, the bibliographer is likely to
document features of a body of scholarly literature that may be missed
by the scholar digging deep into the substantive arguments of one
subtopic. The scholar seeks a deep understanding of the content of a
topic covered by the scholarly literature, while the bibliographicscholar seeks to understand the bibliographic make-up of that scholarly
literature. The texture, detail, context, and nuance of the bibliographic
make-up that the bibliographer can document and analyze are largely
undetectable in database searching. The bibliographer then provides
this perspective back to the scholar and thereby plays a valuable role
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in the scholarly process.
Scholarship conducted from this
bibliographic perspective is what I call bibliographic scholarship.
This type of bibliographic scholarship is different from
substantive scholarship in other ways as well. Substantive scholarship
starts with the topic and uses substantive arguments from other sources
in a variety of ways to make an argument about that substantive topic,
and, in turn, to create a new source on that topic that joins the panoply
of sources for the next scholar to explore. Bibliographic scholarship
takes a step back from this substantive scholarly conversation in favor
of a larger context. It starts with the sources that already exist, but
instead of using the substantive arguments in those sources,
bibliographic scholarship looks to the larger structure of those sources.
Instead of zeroing in upon what another source argues in a close look,
it zooms out to the 30,000-foot level to get a sense of how (or whether)
an “ecosystem” or “tapestry” of sources fits together. Taking this view
provides two different types of information. First, it can tell us
something about the substantive arguments, but from a different
vantage than traditional substantive scholarship, which then can be
used by the traditional scholars to re-zoom in on arguments. It can also
tell us about the scholars and the scholarship from a quasi-sociological
standpoint, a sort of meta-analysis of how the sources fit together.
The goal of this essay is to provide a pilot study of how this rezooming takes place. I intend to unspool one thread (of many) running
through this “tapestry” of legal scholarship in Jewish law identified in
my bibliography, and preliminarily, to analyze it.
Part II of this essay recounts my findings from the bibliography
Legal Scholarship in Jewish Law and describes several examples of
early law scholarship that are defensive about Jewish law. Part III of
this essay provides a deeper look at these law review articles, and
complicates my initial impression about them, questioning the
necessity of the defensiveness found in the early Jewish law scholarly
literature. Finally, Part IV of this essay provides a brief example of
how bibliography and bibliographic scholarship can provide the
foundation for substantive scholarship by exploring potential parallels
between early and contemporary treatments of Jewish law in the
academic law literature.
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PART II

When I was writing Legal Scholarship in Jewish Law, I noticed
something intriguing about many of the early law review articles,
written from the late nineteenth century through about 1940. The
writers of these articles often seem to be responding, rather
defensively, to something about the existing views of Jewish law in
legal academia. That “something” to which the authors were
responding is not always clearly defined, but generally, the authors
take issue with a perception of Jewish law as, undeveloped, harsh,
rigid, or unworthy of serious study. In some cases, the authors take
issue with a treatment of Jewish law that is limited to the Bible,
ignoring the vast body of Talmudic law. Some authors seem
uninterested in exploring why these misperceptions exist, and others
posit varying reasons for the misperceptions, such as general ignorance
or misunderstanding, or even anti-Jewish animus. The clear trend that
emerges from these early articles is that writers about Jewish law
agreed that something about the existing scholarly literature was amiss
and needed to be answered. The list below will briefly describe several
examples of these defensive articles that I discovered while I wrote the
bibliography. Following that, Part III will offer an introduction to how
a close analysis of this defensiveness trend might begin.
The Growth of Jewish Law, 1 LAW MAG. &
REV. 569 (1872). This article summarizes the growth
of Jewish law from the Torah into the Mishna and
Gemara in order to counter the view that Jewish law
does not warrant study because it is static and never
developed beyond Biblical text.
Theodore Spector, Some Fundamental
Concepts of Hebrew Criminal Jurisprudence, 15 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1924). Spector opens
this article with a defense of Jewish law generally, and
then spends the main part of this article explicitly
countering stigmatization of Talmudic criminal law as
cruel.
F.G. McKean, Some Humane Features of
Pentateuchal Law, 35 DICK. L. REV. 13 (1930). Hinting
at his defensiveness in the article’s title, McKean
argues against what he describes as a common
understanding of Biblical law as cruel and harsh.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/10

4

Hollander: Scholarly Investigation

2020

SCHOLARLY INVESTIGATION

95

Bertram B. Benas, A Plea for an English
History of Jewish Law, 44 JURID. REV. 39 (1932). In
this article, the author laments that there is little existing
English-language scholarship on Jewish law.
Paul L. Ross, Lawyers and Judges in Hebrew
Jurisprudence, 67 U.S. L. REV. 19 (1933). Before
digging into the specific topic of this article, lawyers
and judges, the author criticizes the existing scholarship
for its ignorance of the Jewish oral tradition (the
Mishna) and the large body of Talmudic law.
Jehudah Braver, Criminal Law According to the
Hebrew Code, 2 KAN. CITY L. REV. 104 (1934). This
article aims to explain the Jewish criminal code, and
more importantly, argue that it is a humane and just
code, both by comparing Jewish criminal law to other
legal systems, and by exploring Jewish law’s own
procedural hurdles to some of its seemingly harsh rules.
G.J.W., Response to Recognition of
Polygamous Marriages in Mosaic Law, 49 LAW Q.
REV. 19 (1933). This short article is a response to an
earlier article written by a leading comparative law
scholar, W.E. Beckett. The author of this response
claims that Beckett’s article’s description of Jewish law
contains major inaccuracies.
Max May, Jewish Criminal Law and Legal
Procedure, 31 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 8 (1940). This
article aims to describe Jewish criminal law and
procedure, but because Jewish law has been the “stepchild of scholarly investigation,” May feels it necessary
to state that Jewish law should be seen to have intrinsic
value as a highly developed and just legal system.
The defensiveness present in so many of the early articles
indicates something. The consistency illustrates, at least, the
perception among authors of articles about Jewish law that something
in the existing scholarship was amiss. Discovering such features
across a body of scholarly literature is exactly the type of new
information that bibliographic scholarship can yield, and the
bibliographer’s role is to find and describe such features. In the
following section of this essay, I will describe this feature of Jewish
legal scholarship in some greater detail.
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PART III

In this section of this essay, I dig a little deeper into several of
the articles listed above. Here I am still engaging in bibliographic
scholarship but taking a closer look that begins the process of zooming
into scholarly literature in a substantive way. By looking at these
articles closer, what more might we learn about why these articles
seem to start on such a defensive posture? I will first look at one of
the earliest examples of an article that raises the issue of the treatment
of Jewish law by legal scholars. Then I will examine two later articles
that put this issue at the center of their arguments. Finally, I will look
at several articles that take up the specific accusation that Jewish law
is cruel and harsh.
One of the earliest dated articles I found provides evidence of
several trends seen in the later ones. In an 1872 article, an anonymous
writer laments the neglect of the study of Jewish law in the then-new
field of historical jurisprudence. The author laments the common view
that Torah law underwent no growth or development that would make
it worthy of study. One major theme, seen here and throughout later
articles, is the argument against the neglect of post-Biblical Jewish
law, mainly in the Talmud. 3 Second, the author asserts a clear reason
for this neglect. It is not mere ignorance, but rather anti-Jewish
prejudice. “[T]he neglect of [study of the law of the Torah and
Talmud] is due only to the prejudice, which claims for the law of the
Pentateuch that stereotyped and unchangeable character which can
suppose no growth or development.” 4 Embedded in this quote is a hint
at yet another theme in addition to a critique of scholars’ neglect of
Talmudic material: the understanding that Jewish law is rigid, simple,
and unchanging. Two of these themes, neglect of the Talmud and the
view that Jewish law is rigid, are described repeatedly in other early
law journal articles. However, the accusation of anti-Jewish prejudice
is rarely so explicitly voiced as it is here. But what is clear is that this
1872 article is speaking out against several perceptions about the
prevailing treatment of Jewish law, and its critique is echoed for the
following decades.
This echo can be heard in the work of Bertram Benas, writing
almost sixty years later. And Benas names names. To illustrate his
3
4

The Growth of Jewish Law, 1 LAW MAG. & REV. 569, 570-71 (1872).
Id. at 577.
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claim that post-Biblical Jewish law is “largely unknown” 5 in the West,
he cites an extraordinary statement from William Markby, a leading
late nineteenth century British legal scholar: “[T]he Jews never seem
to have arrived at any very clear notions about law, at least not about
their own law.” 6 Markby was a lawyer and judge, who spent much of
his professional life in India serving on the high court of Bengal, where
he was known to be a liberal who sympathized with the Indian
independence movement. 7 After his appointment in India, he returned
to England where he was appointed to teach Indian law at Oxford. 8
These details of Markby’s life illustrate that his ignorance of Jewish
law cannot be solely blamed upon a general Western chauvinism given
that he was an expert on Indian law with long exposure to both the
legal and general worlds beyond England. And yet, in his writing, he
appears to have no knowledge of the existence of Jewish law. Benas
points to no evidence of a personal animus toward Jews in Markby’s
writings, but, like the anonymous author from 1872, he suggests a
general anti-Jewish attitude among legal scholars: “When the reign of
law in the world is to be extolled, then it is the gift of the Romans; but
when its galling yoke is to be condemned, then it is the typical
possession of Jewry, the burden of which Jewry has handed down to a
law-ridden and law-laden world.” 9 In sum, Benas cites Markby to
voice his strong perception that Jewish law is neglected by legal
scholars due to prejudice, and Markby’s prejudice from the 1870s
remained true, according to Benas, in the 1930s.
However, a closer look at Benas brings that critique into
question. In the course of making his case, Benas spends a remarkable
amount of time discussing the exceptions, citing scholars who give
Jewish law its due credit as an important legal system. For example,
Benas cites Frederick Pollack and Frederic William Maitland 10 and, of
5 Bertram B. Benas, A Plea for an English History of Jewish Law, 44 JURID. REV. 39, 41
(1932).
6 William Markby, ELEMENTS OF LAW (London, Oxford, 3d ed. 1885).
7 T.G. Watkin, Sir William Markby, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
(H.C.G Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., 2004).
8 Id.
9 Benas, supra note 5, at 41.
10 Id. at 46; see FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 123 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1895) (“We
may guess that if the Jews had not been expelled from England the clumsy mortgage by way
of conditional conveyance would have given way to a simpler method of securing debts, and
would not still be incumbering our modern law.”). Benas notes that this reference to Jews is
related to the unique Anglo-Jewish history related to finance rather than to Jewish law itself.
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course, John Selden. 11 He also quotes, at length, Guy Carleton Lee’s
Historical Jurisprudence as an example of a scholar providing a fair
reading of Jewish law, and its role in the history of jurisprudence. 12
Given these numerous exceptions, it is fair to ask whether an antiJewish bias was as pervasive as Benas might claim.
The citation to Lee is illustrative on this front. First, Benas
praises Lee for devoting an entire twenty-seven page chapter of his
history of law to the “Law of Israel.” 13 However, Benas expresses
some mild disappointment that of those twenty-seven pages, the first
twenty-five and a half deal only with Biblical law, ignoring completely
Talmudic and rabbinic literature. 14 Nevertheless, Benas is thrilled with
the short, one and a half page section at the end of the chapter on what
Lee terms “Later Hebrew Law.” 15 Benas explains that this short
section “astonishes the Jewish reader…with the sense of freshness that
an oasis in a desert presents to the searching traveler.” 16 Benas then
continues to quote almost the entire page and a half from Lee. 17
In sum, Benas makes the case that an English language history
of Jewish law is necessary in order for Jewish law to overcome its
neglect by legal scholars and to take its rightful influential place in
academic jurisprudence. However, Benas cites to numerous sources
that do not neglect Jewish law, and these might be cobbled together to
conclude that perhaps Jewish law is not as neglected as he might think.
Still, by citing to the inaccurate, even ignorant, claims of Markby, it is
clear that at least some legal scholars had, at best, a blind spot when
looking at Jewish law. And given the number of late nineteenth and
early twentieth century legal scholars that at least perceive a measure
of bias against or ignorance of Jewish law, it is not possible to conclude
that Benas is completely wrong.
Another example of a scholar with a blind spot about Jewish
law comes in an anonymous response to a 1932 article by a renowned

Nevertheless, Benas argues that this reference to Jewry qualifies as a “brilliant flash[]” to be
lauded. See Benas, supra note 5, at 46.
11 See Benas, supra note 5, at 47.
12 Guy Carleton Lee, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1900).
13 Benas, supra note 5, at 43.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 43-44.
17 Id. at 44-45.
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legal scholar, W.E. Beckett. 18 Beckett wrote frequently in law journals
on comparative law and related subjects, 19 and indeed this very article
was cited, somewhat ironically given its treatment of Jewish law, by
Israel’s Supreme Court. 20 In this article, Beckett makes sweeping, but
wildly incomplete, statements about polygamy and Jewish law. He
states:
Though Jews do not practise polygamy in
England or any European country, Mosaic law permits
it. In Near Eastern countries or in countries like
Morocco where Jews are governed in personal status
matters entirely by Jewish law, Jewish husbands would
certainly have the right under the local law to take more
than one wife and both marriages would be good
marriages. . . . On the other hand, Jews domiciled in
England or other European countries have no doubt lost
by the law of their domicil the right actually to possess
more than one wife. 21
Here, Beckett is making a correct conclusion, but for an
incorrect reason, and reveals an ignorance about Jewish law that calls
into question his ability to speak at all about the topic. European Jews,
indeed, did not practice polygamy. However, as a close contemporary
reader of Beckett’s article points out in a retort published in the same
journal the following year, the reason was unrelated to modern
comparative law, Beckett’s specialty. 22 To make this case, the
unidentified author first points out that Beckett conflates “Mosaic”
law, which usually refers to Biblical law, and “Jewish” law, which
18 W.E. Beckett, The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages Under English Law, 48 L.Q.
REV. 341 (1932).
19 See, e.g., W.E. Beckett, Consular Immunities, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 34 (1944); W.E.
Beckett, International Law in England, 55 L.Q. REV. 257 (1939); W.E. Beckett, The Question
of Classification (Qualification) in Private International Law, 15 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 46
(1934); W.E. Beckett, Diplomatic Claims in Respect of Injuries to Companies, 17
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 175 (1931); W.E. Beckett, The Exercise of Criminal
Jurisdiction over Foreigners, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 44 (1925); W.E. Beckett, What is Private
International Law, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 73 (1926); W.E. Beckett, Right to Trade and the
Right to Sue, 39 L.Q. REV. 89 (1923).
20 See C.A. 191/51 Skornik v. Skornik 8(1) P.D. 141 (1954), reprinted in 2 Selected
Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 327, 357 (1963) (citing W.E. Beckett, supra note
18, for the principle that the law of a person’s domicile is used to determine the validity of that
person’s marriage).
21 Beckett, supra note 18, at 359-60.
22 G.J.W., Notes [Response to Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in Mosaic Law], 49
L.Q. REV. 19 (1933).
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refers to the whole body of Jewish law, within which the post-Biblical
laws of the Talmud and other rabbinical writings are essential. Beckett
employs those terms interchangeably in consecutive sentences in the
quote provided above. 23 The anonymous author explains that while
Mosaic law is the foundation of Jewish law, “in the course of one
thousand years and more a great superstructure has been erected” upon
that foundation. 24 Jewish law is that superstructure. And while Mosaic
law permits polygamy, for European Jews, Jewish law does not. As
the great superstructure of Jewish law developed, monogamy became
more and more the Jewish norm, beginning as early as the sixth century
B.C.E., and by the Talmudic era, polygamy was the exception. 25 These
trends were accelerated by enactment over the centuries of Jewish laws
that imposed requirements upon husbands that would make
maintenance of multiple wives difficult. 26 Finally, in 1025 C.E., Rabbi
Gershom ben Judah imposed an absolute ban on polygamy that was
adopted universally in European Jewish communities. 27 Beckett’s
critic concludes that “it is not by the law of their domicil that Jews
domiciled in the countries of Europe have lost ‘the right actually to
possess more than one wife.’ For by Jewish law, apart from the law of
the domicil, they have no such right.” 28 What underlies this exchange
between Beckett and his anonymous critic? Beckett, a leading scholar
of international and comparative law, 29 appears to lack basic
knowledge of Jewish law, and indeed even appears to be ignorant of
the existence of post-Biblical Jewish law. Despite this, he advances
sweeping characterizations of Jewish law. However, his mistakes do
not pass unnoticed, and in twenty-first-century lingo, he is “called out”
swiftly in the very journal where he makes his initial mistakes. We
can learn from this that ignorance of Jewish law among law scholars,
even if pervasive, was quickly answered. This attests to the
contemporaneous presence of non-ignorant scholars of Jewish law,
and this complicates the observation that ignorance of Jewish law was
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
25 Id. at 20.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. (quoting Beckett, supra note 18 at 360).
29 See supra note 19. In addition, in the 1940s Beckett served as a legal advisor to the
Foreign Office of the British government about the relationship between British law and the
League of Nations. See Geoffrey Marston, The Origin of the Personality of International
Organisations in United Kingdom Law, 40 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 403, 406-09 (1991).
23
24
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uniform, or even pervasive, in the legal academy in the early twentieth
century.
That said, many articles of this period go beyond the critique
that too many scholars are ignorant of Jewish law. Rather, they
specifically charge that scholars characterize Jewish law, inaccurately,
as cruel and harsh, especially on the subject of criminal law. Writing
in 1930, F.G. McKean argues against the “prevalent…conventional
impression” that “designate[s] Jewish law as a harsh and cruel
system.” 30 Such a view, he explains, ignores principles and precepts
that exhibit a humanity often missing in American law, both
historically up until 1930, when McKean is writing. 31 Examples
offered are the prohibition of cruelty to animals, the prohibition of
torture, the prohibition of life-long slavery, and the existence of
protections for debtors, among others. 32 As per the title of his article,
McKean only addresses Biblical law, leaving the vast corpus of
rabbinical law out of his analysis. Because of this, McKean excludes
some of the ripest arguments against the harshness of Jewish law. For
example, he defends the Biblical law of “eye for an eye,” by arguing
that the principle underlying the seemingly harsh rule is not truly harsh,
namely the principle that a wrong-doer should be punished
proportionately to his or her crime. 33 While this is a strong point, an
even stronger rebuttal to accusations of a harsh Jewish law is found in
post-Biblical law, whereby the rabbis of the Mishna take for granted
that “eye for an eye” should not be taken literally, but as a stand-in for
proportionate monetary compensation for injury. 34 Jehudah Braver
makes exactly this point. 35 He explains that as far back as during the
time of Roman rule of Israel, the rabbis presumed that “eye for an eye”
should not be understood literally, while at the same time this harsh
punishment was “rigorously enforced by the Romans.” 36 Braver also
F.G. McKean, Some Humane Features of Pentateuchal Law, 35 DICK. L. REV. 13, 13
(1930).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 14.
34 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Kamma 83b and 84a.
35 Jehudah Braver, Criminal Law According to the Hebrew Code, 2 Kan. City L. Rev. 104,
105 (1934).
36 Id. (citing EDWARD GIBBONS, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, CHAP.
XLIV). See also EDWARD GIBBONS, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, CHAP.
XLIV, 381 (Electric Book Company, 2000) (“They [Roman statutes] approve the inhuman
and unequal principle of retaliation; and the forfeit of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a
30
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counters the notion that Jewish criminal law was unduly harsh by
noting that English criminal law imposed the death penalty for over
160 crimes until the early nineteenth century, 37 millennia after Jewish
law limited the death penalty to only a few crimes, required exacting
evidentiary standards, and rarely, if ever, imposed it. 38 And finally,
writing in 1940, Max May also makes an additional the case for the
humanity of Jewish law, specifically Jewish criminal law. He argues
that even though pre-Talmudic Biblical law may seem “unduly harsh
or even barbaric,” it also provides countervailing humane principles
that soften the admittedly harsh laws, such as equality before the law
and a system of legal procedure intended to ensure fairness. 39 To
summarize, many early scholars of Jewish law in the legal academy
appear to be answering what they perceive to be an inaccurate
understanding of Jewish criminal as harsh and cruel.
In this section of this essay, I took a closer look at several of
the articles I noted in Legal Scholarship in Jewish Law as having a
defensive posture on Jewish law. This closer look reveals several
trends. First, it is true that some highly respected scholars appeared to
be ignorant of Jewish law, for example Markby and Beckett. Second,
many scholars writing about Jewish law perceived a general ignorance
of Jewish law, especially of post-Biblical law, and that some sort of
bias against Judaism is related to this ignorance. Third, there are many
examples of fair and reasonable treatments of Jewish law written
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 40 This third
point complicates the first two, calling into question the pervasiveness
of the perceived ignorance. Perhaps this deeper look at the examples
reveals that the inaccurate portrayals of Jewish law are not as pervasive
as it initially appeared, or at least that these portrayals were not fully
representative of Jewish legal scholarship of that era. Perhaps the
concerns of the early Jewish law scholars were not warranted.
limb for a limb, is rigorously exacted, unless the offender can redeem his pardon by a fine of
three hundred pounds of copper.”).
37 Id. at 105.
38 See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Makkot 7a-8b.
39 Max May, Jewish Criminal Law and Legal Procedure, 31 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 438,
439 (1940).
40 See generally supra notes 10, 11, and 12. See also Bertram B. Benas, Renascence of
Jewish Law, 2 J. COMP. LEGIS. AND INT’L L. 21- 28 (1920); J. Herbstein, Jewish Law, 42 S.
AFR. L. 4-13 (1925); Isaac Herzog, Moral Rights and Duties in Jewish Law, 41 JURID. REV.
60 (1929); Isaac Herzog, Legacies to Creditors and Satisfaction of Debt in Jewish Law, 6
TEMP. L.Q. 87 (1931).
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PART IV

In the previous section of this essay, I engaged in bibliographic
scholarship. To review, as a bibliographer I found, compiled and
described a scholarly literature. In this process I noted that many latenineteenth and early twentieth century articles addressing Jewish law
exhibited a defensiveness about the existing scholarship,
characterizing it as ignorant. Upon digging deeper, it is clear that the
literature is a bit more complex than some of these descriptions. While
there are some egregious examples of scholarship that is ignorant of
Jewish law, there are many counter-examples. In this section of this
essay, I begin to move cautiously from bibliographic scholarship into
substantive scholarship, mainly for the purpose of illustrating how the
bibliographer’s work can be handed off to the substantive scholar for
further and deeper study. This section is intended to be a first pass at
such an effort, illustrative of the potential for further study after a
bibliographic scholar finishes his or her work, and the substantive
scholar takes over.
By the late twentieth century, law review articles addressing
Jewish laws had become a “small but significant body of
scholarship.” 41 Responding to this development, Suzanne Last Stone
argues that much of this scholarship misunderstands the nature of the
Jewish legal system, and therefore, applies Jewish law to the American
legal system in ways that simply do not make much sense. 42 How
might this contemporary critique of legal scholarship in Jewish law
relate to the early twentieth century critiques of Jewish law scholarship
analyzed in Part III? Might the concerns of a hundred years ago about
Jewish law scholarship relate to concerns about that scholarship today?
Are there any parallels or contrasts between these two examples of
critical scholarship?
As discussed previously, early twentieth century scholars
critique portrayals of Jewish law as inaccurate, and accuse these
portrayals of ignoring the bulk of the Jewish legal corpus in the
Talmud. 43 According to these critiques, these inaccurate portrayals are
also often unduly critical of the Jewish legal system as unchanging, or

41 See Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal
Model in Contemporary Jewish Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 (1993).
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Benas, supra note 5; G.J.W. supra note 5.
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overly harsh. 44 Moreover, many of the scholars suspect that these
portrayals of Jewish law are motivated by an anti-Judaism animus.45
Stone, writing about one hundred years later, is also critiquing
inaccurate portrayals of Jewish law, but instead of finding the
portrayals of Jewish law as overly critical or motivated by bigotry,
Stone indicates that the inaccuracies are motivated by the opposite, a
sort of philosemitism. According to Stone, within this “new genre of
Jewish-American legal scholarship,” each scholar has his or her own
conception of the nature of Jewish law. Some conceive it as antihierarchical, and some as egalitarian. Others conceive Jewish law as
communitarian, analogous to feminist jurisprudence, or obligationbased, etc. Each writer offers his or her conception as an example
with which to contrast, or model the American legal system. 46 In other
words, Jewish law is viewed as ripe for inspiration for whatever a
scholar happens to be advocating. However, Stone contends that this
tendency results in inaccurate portrayals of Jewish law by failing to
account for the true religious nature of the Jewish legal system. These
scholars are engaging in “wishful thinking” about Jewish law.47
Because these scholars misunderstand or even disregard the religious
nature of the Jewish legal system, their use of “the history, philosophy,
or interpretive techniques of Jewish law to reconstruct American legal
theory” 48 leads to inaccurate conclusions. So like the early twentieth
century Jewish law scholars, Stone argues that the existing scholarship
fails to describe Jewish law accurately. But while the early twentieth
century scholars are most concerned about portrayals that are overly
rigid, harsh and motivated by anti-Jewish feelings, Stone worries about
portrayals of Jewish law that are too elastic, and motivated by
misplaced philosemitism that fails to see Jewish law clearly.
Interestingly, in addition to echoing the early twentieth century
critics of Jewish law scholarship, Stone also echoes one of the
counterexamples of accurate Jewish law scholarship cited by one of
the critics, Bertram Benas: Guy Carlton Lee’s Historical
Jurisprudence. 49 In Benas’s early twentieth century plea for better and
more accurate legal scholarship on Jewish law, Lee is featured as a rare
44
45
46
47
48
49

See, e.g., McKean, supra note 30.
See, e.g., The Growth of Jewish Law, supra note 3.
See Stone, supra note 41, at 818-19.
Id. at 814, 818-19, 893-94.
Id. at 818.
See Benas, supra note 5.
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exception to the neglect or mistreatment of Jewish law. 50 And indeed,
his fulsome understanding and description of the Jewish legal system
appear to stand the test of time, and eerily predicting Stone’s critique
of the legal academy’s use of Jewish law a century later.
In Historical Jurisprudence, Lee offers a summary of the
history of Jewish law; the chapter addressing Jewish law ends with a
brief description of the often neglected corpus of Talmudic, or
rabbinic, law, which he terms “later Hebrew Law.” 51 A close look at
Lee’s description of “later Hebrew law” astounds in its echoing of late
twentieth century debates about the place of Jewish legal scholarship
in the legal academy in ways that neither Benas could have imagined
in 1932, nor Lee in 1900. To start, rabbinic Jewish law is cogently and
elegantly defined by Lee:
[i]n the last centuries of the Hebrew national life
and those immediately following the overthrow of the
Jewish State, the Hebrew law, as it is contained in the
Pentateuch, became the subject of an elaborate
comment, which has been preserved in the Talmud.
This great collection of legal treatises and expositions
of the law covers the whole of the Pentateuch, and has
obtained in the Jewish legal system much the same
authority as did the Roman law in the glosses in the law
schools of Bologna. The text upon which the comment
was written and the treatises found has been quite
superseded by the gloss. 52
This definition is quite sophisticated, and elegantly written,
even if one might quibble with Lee’s failure to distinguish between the
Mishna and the Gemara. However, what is most interesting about
Lee’s chapter on Jewish law is his analysis of the relation of Jewish
law to Jewish sovereignty and the Jewish religion. He focuses his
analysis of the Jewish legal system and its relationship to the “Hebrew
religion.” 53 He explains that “religious fervor gave [the Jewish legal
system] a longer hold on life than might have been the case had it
depended merely upon its juristic excellencies.” 54 The Jewish legal
system’s connection to religion became even more important after the
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 43-44.
Lee, supra note 12, at 120.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 121.
Id.
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destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, and the loss of Jewish
sovereignty. Even though “Jewish law was deprived of much of its
authority…its religious element was brought into greater
prominence,” 55 explains Lee. After its loss of authority, the study of
Jewish law became even more important to the Jewish religion.56
Indeed, argues Lee, it is the intimate connection between religion and
law that is at the root of the survival of both Judaism and its legal
system. 57 This description of an intertwined religion and legal system
more than faintly echoes the arguments of the contemporary legal
scholar Suzanne Last Stone, writing almost one hundred years after
Lee. 58 And like Stone, Lee clearly describes the inseparable
relationship between Jewish law and the Jewish religion as a key
feature of the legal system itself. Moreover, Lee traces influence of
Jewish law to “Christian legislation,” 59 not secular American law, as
those criticized by Stone do. 60
It is essential to note that Stone’s critique of legal scholarship
in Jewish law has not gone unanswered. Samuel J. Levine, one of the
most prolific scholars of Jewish law in the legal academy, addresses
Stone’s challenge head-on in a 1997 article. 61 Levine states that while
he is “mindful of Stone’s observations,” he seeks to “provide a
framework through which to consider the Jewish legal system on its
own terms, before applying it to American legal theory.” 62 While he
does concede Stone’s point about the “fundamental differences”
between Jewish law (a religious legal system) and American law (a
secular legal system), Levine contends that, despite Stone’s warning,
“certain conceptual similarities between American law and Jewish law
allow for meaningful yet cautious comparison of the two systems.”63
Levine then offers a lengthy explanation of the Jewish legal system
“on its own terms,” focusing on how Jewish law is interpreted from
within the Jewish legal system. In an important 2010 article, Levine
expands upon this effort, offering a “methodological assessment” of
55

Id.
Id.
57 Id.
58 See Stone, supra note 41.
59 Lee, supra note 12, at 122.
60 See Stone, supra note 41, at 814, 818-19, 893-94.
61 Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some
Comparison and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 441 (1997).
62 See id. at 444.
63 See id.
56

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/10

16

Hollander: Scholarly Investigation

2020

SCHOLARLY INVESTIGATION

107

the development of Jewish legal scholarship in the legal academy
generally, and proposing as a model for future scholarship of this type,
an “effective methodology for applying a given principle from Jewish
legal theory to American law and public policy.” 64 Levine’s threepronged model requires analysis that:
(1) carefully and accurately depicts the
principle [of Jewish law], as understood within Jewish
legal theory, in a way that is faithful to the Jewish legal
system; (2) considers carefully the extent to which the
principle incorporates theological underpinnings that
are particular to the Jewish legal model, and
accordingly, may not be suitable in the context of the
American legal model; and (3) applies the lessons from
the Jewish legal system only to the extent that they
make sense within the internal logic of the American
legal system,
thus remaining faithful to Jewish law. 65 And in the ensuing
years, this scholarship has blossomed. Building upon Levine’s model,
legal scholarship in Jewish law remains, as Stone described it, small,
but even more significant. 66
64 Samuel J. Levine, Applying Jewish Legal Theory in the Context of American Law and
Legal Scholarship: A Methodological Analysis, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 933, 934, 937 (2010).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on
“Eye for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, An
Introduction to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the American Legal System, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 916 (1999); Alan M. Sokobin, Child Abuse: A Study in Comparative
American and Jewish Law, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 401 (2000); Note, Looking to Statutory
Intertext: Toward the use of the Rabbinic Biblical Interpretive Stance in American Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (2002); Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law: Duties of
the Intellect, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386 (2003); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Ten
Commandments and the Lesser Included Offenses of Murder and Theft, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 693
(2003); Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, with
Application to the American Legal System: A Psychological and Philosophical Analysis, 28
Loy. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L REV. 257 (2006); Martin H. Pritikin, Punishment, Prisons, and the
Bible: Does “Old Testament Justice” Justify Our Retributive Culture?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
715 (2006); Elimelech Westreich, Elements of Negotiability in Jewish Law in Medieval
Christian Spain, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411 (2010); Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish and
American Bankruptcy Law: Their Similarities, Differences, and Interactions, 19 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 551 (2011); J. David Bleich, Support of Non-Biological Children in Jewish Law,
3 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 61 (2012); Steven H. Resnicoff, Family Planning and Government
Regulation: Jewish Law Perspectives, 15 DEPAUL J. OF HEALTH CARE L. 15 (2013); Charlotte
Elisheva Fonrobert, Installations of Jewish Law in Public Urban Space: An American Eruv
Controversy, 90 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 63 (2015); Gertrude N. Levine & Samuel J. Levine,
Internet Ethics, American Law, and Jewish Law: A Comparative Overview, 21 J. of Tech. L.
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In this section, I gave a brief example of substantive
scholarship that can grow out of bibliographic scholarship. The
analysis moved beyond a bibliographic exploration of a body of
literature, and into the substance of the author’s arguments. I began to
describe parallel themes found in the early twentieth century legal
critiques of Jewish law scholarship to late twentieth and early twentyfirst century critiques of Jewish law scholarship as a means to illustrate
how bibliographic scholarship can provide the foundation for
substantive scholarship.
V.

CONCLUSION

Librarians play many roles in today’s academic environment,
and unfortunately, the role of a traditional bibliographer is often
eclipsed by the day-to-day work of ordering materials and helping
researchers. However, large-scale bibliographies, which I call
bibliographic scholarship, provide a fertile seedbed for advancing
traditional substantive scholarship. Features and trends in a body of
scholarship can be uncovered by the bibliographer. In this paper I trace
how this process unfolds. In my bibliography Legal Scholarship in
Jewish Law, I noted that early twentieth century articles about Jewish
law seemed to be consistently defensive, as if they were arguing
against several negative and prevailing notions about Jewish law. A
closer look at these article reveals that perhaps the defensiveness in
these articles might be unnecessarily overheated. Finally, I provided a
brief introduction of the type of substantive scholarship that might
result from the information uncovered from the bibliographic
scholarship.

& Pol. 37 (2006); Avishalom Westreich, Accommodating Religious Law with a Civil Legal
System: Lessons From The Jewish Law Experience In Financial Family Matters, 33 J.L. &
REL. 481 (2018).
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